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What’s the Matter with Liberalism?
Reassessing Voting, Politics, and Ideology
George H. Taylor
Abstract
The 2004 presidential election raised at least two questions for election law anal-
ysis. First, in contrast to the past several decades of low voter turnout, why were
voters so motivated to go to the polls in 2004? Second, why did many voters who
were part of the Democrats’ traditional base vote in opposition to what was widely
considered to be their economic self-interest? My argument is that the answer to
these questions can be conjoined by reviving and reinvigorating a non-pejorative
theory of ideology.
A revised theory of ideology recognizes the multiple levels on which ideologies –
both political and legal – operate. Ideology encompasses not only possible voter
distortion – the accusation typically hurled against one’s opponent – but the mo-
tivations for one’s own partisan beliefs. As such, ideology has a deeper, more
positive characteristic: it can act to integrate an individual’s or group’s sense of
identity.
In order for the present political and legal dynamics to be understood and changed,
then, we must recapture the multiple characteristics of ideology, both as distortive
and as constitutive and integrative. This revival of ideology is also ineluctable:
it comports with the very way the mind is structured. Here I draw on not only
theories of ideology but other work in the cognitive sciences. The divide is not
between one political party’s right reason and the other’s distorted ideology but
between two ideologies, with all their negative and positive components. I con-
clude by examining how political persuasion, change, and transformation are pos-
sible within this ideological framework. The Article assists the subtlety by which
election law analysis investigates and assesses voter motivation.
What’s the Matter with Liberalism? 
Reassessing Voting, Politics, and Ideology 
 
George H. Taylor 
 
The 2004 presidential election raised at least two questions for election law analysis.  
First, in contrast to the past several decades of low voter turnout, why were voters so motivated 
to go to the polls in 2004?  Second, why did many voters who were part of the Democrats’ 
traditional base vote in opposition to what was widely considered to be their economic self-
interest?  My argument is that the answer to these questions can be conjoined by reviving and 
reinvigorating a nonpejorative theory of ideology. 
 
A revised theory of ideology recognizes the multiple levels on which ideologies – both 
political and legal – operate.  Ideology encompasses not only possible voter distortion – the 
accusation typically hurled against one’s opponent – but the motivations for one’s own partisan 
beliefs.  As such, ideology has a deeper, more positive characteristic:  it can act to integrate an 
individual’s or group’s sense of identity.   
 
In order for the present political and legal dynamics to be understood and changed, then, 
we must recapture the multiple characteristics of ideology, both as distortive and as constitutive 
and integrative.  This revival of ideology is also ineluctable:  it comports with the very way the 
mind is structured.  Here I draw on not only theories of ideology but other work in the cognitive 
sciences.  The divide is not between one political party’s right reason and the other’s distorted 
ideology but between two ideologies, with all their negative and positive components.   I 
conclude by examining how political persuasion, change, and transformation are possible within 
this ideological framework.  The Article assists the subtlety by which election law analysis 
investigates and assesses voter motivation. 
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1What’s the Matter with Liberalism? 
Reassessing Voting, Politics, and Ideology 
George H. Taylor*
Introduction 
The morning of November 2, 2004 – election day – dawned in the Cleveland area with the 
prospect of rain.  By 6:30 a.m. I was on the street, ready to begin my day as a supervisor of 
Democratic designated challengers at the polls.1 The Democratic challengers were assigned to 
individual polling precincts with the objective of trying to protect the right to vote of voters whose 
qualifications – for example, nationality – might be questioned by Republican challengers.2 I was to 
supervise a group of nearly a dozen challengers in precincts in Cleveland’s Ward 14, on the west side 
of the city.3
* Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.  I owe considerable thanks to 
Michelle Donahue for her research assistance. 
1 Although I teach at the University of Pittsburgh, I live in the Cleveland area, where my 
spouse teaches. 
2 The rights for designated challengers to enter polling precincts are provided under Ohio 
statute.  See OHIO R.C. ANN. § 3505.21. During the week prior to the election, I had served as an 
active volunteer in the effort to set up and organize the Democratic designated challenger program.  
Of particular concern for our challenger program was the expectation that Republican challengers 
would target precincts in heavily minority areas, which traditionally vote Democratic.  The 
Republican challenges could intimidate voters and create voting delay, both potentially leading 
voters to leave the polls without voting.  See Preserving Democracy: What Went Wrong in Ohio.  
Status Report of the House Judiciary Committee Democratic Staff, Jan. 5, 2005, at 43-47 [hereinafter 
The Conyers Report] (available at  www.house.gov/judiciary_democrats/ ohiostatusrept1505.pdf) 
(citing evidence of these tactics).  This Report was initiated by Representative John Conyers, Jr., the 
Ranking Democrat on the House Judiciary Committee.  See id. at 4.  The Report is now available in 
book form.  See WHAT WENT WRONG IN OHIO: THE CONYERS REPORT ON THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTION (Anita Miller ed., 2005). 
3 See www.clevelandcitycouncil.org/office/ward14.pdf (providing ward map, including 
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art31
2The day was a long and eventful one.  We were on the job from the time the polls opened at 
6:30 until they closed at 7:30 that evening.4 The rain came, but, at least in Ward 14, the Republican 
challengers did not.5 Instead, the Democratic challengers and I tried to assist pollworkers’ efforts  to 
handle the very high turnout.  Because of a state requirement that voters had to vote in the precinct in 
which they resided in order for their vote to be counted,6 several challengers also spent hours on the 
telephone contacting the County Board of Elections to try to determine the correct polling places for 
voters not listed on the voting lists at the precincts they went to.  Challengers as well spent a great 
deal of time assisting poll workers in helping voters fill out the complicated forms for provisional 
ballots, designed for voters who were certain they were voting in their home precinct but were for 
some reason – for example, a recent move – not listed in the precinct voting register.7
Many questions have been raised about the accuracy of the vote count in Ohio and the 
number of voters who were disenfranchised, including those who left the polls without voting 
because of inordinately long lines8 or whose provisional ballots were not counted for illegitimate 
 
polling places).  
4 Some challengers were also assigned at the end of the day to follow the ballots downtown to 
the County Board of Elections, to ensure that there was no interference with the ballots cast. 
5 Republican challengers did present themselves and at times caused disruption in precincts in 
other parts of the city of Cleveland and elsewhere in Cuyahoga County.  See, e.g., James F. McCarty 
& Chris Seper, Campaigns Chase Voters in Cuyahoga, PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 3, 2004, at S9. 
6 See Sandusky County Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 565, 574-79 (6th Cir. 2004). 
7 The Help America Voting Act of 2002 (HAVA), codified at various parts of U.S.C., 
imposed new federal requirements for provisional ballots.  See 42 U.S.C. § 15482(a). 
8 See, e.g., Reginald Fields, Ohio Voters Tell of Election Day Troubles at Hearing, PLAIN 
DEALER, Nov. 14, 2004, at B3.  In part these lines were due to “a wide discrepancy between the 
availability of voting machines in more minority, Democratic and urban areas as compared to more 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
3reasons.9 After the election I myself participated in various actions on some of these issues, 
including the Ohio presidential recount10 and a lawsuit challenging the legal sufficiency of criteria 
used for the counting of provisional ballots.11 In reviewing the election day, though, I want to 
concentrate not on what from a Democratic perspective were its failures  – the total vote in Ohio that 
went in President Bush’s favor12 or the failures and inadequacies of the voting system – but on 
something less attended, the day’s successes.  Throughout election day, as I went from precinct to 
precinct, the poll workers, the Democratic challengers, and I were all amazed at the size of the voter 
turnout.  Voters waited patiently in long lines; challengers told me of voters arriving in wheelchairs 
or carrying oxygen tanks.  At a precinct that was not accessible to those with a physical disability, 
 
Republican, suburban and exurban areas.”  The Conyers Report, supra note 2, at 24. 
9 See, e.g., Diane Solov, System to Blame for Ballot Debacle; Focus Shifts to Finding 
Solutions, PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 24, 2004, at B1.  See also The Conyers Report, supra note 2, at 
78-79.  In general The Conyers Report concludes that there were “numerous, serious election 
irregularities in the Ohio presidential election, which resulted in a significant disenfranchisement of 
voters.”  Id. at 4.  In response to these and other election problems, Cleveland State University has 
recently established a nonpartisan Center for Election Integrity, a partnership of its Colleges of Law 
and Urban Affairs, to study and address issues in election administration at the local, state, and 
national levels. 
10 I was active in the recount process itself and later testified before the Cuyahoga County 
Board of Elections on some of the apparent improprieties by election officials during the recount.  
Subsequently, some election officials were indicted.  See Mark Naymik, 2 Elections Officials 
Indicted in Recount, PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 31, 2005, at B1. 
11 State ex rel. Mackey v. Blackwell, 2004 WL 2973976, 2004-Ohio-7004 (Ohio App. 8 Dist. 
2004 (dismissed on procedural grounds), aff’d, 106 Ohio St. 3d 261, __ N.E.2d __, 2005 WL 
2240857 (Ohio 2005).  The case was brought by the People for the American Way Foundation. 
12 According to the state official results, President Bush received 2,859,768 votes in Ohio and 
John Kerry received 2,741,167, a difference of 118,601.  See http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/
ElectionsVoter/results2004.aspx?Section=135 [hereinafter 2005 Ohio Results]. 
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4ballots were brought to disabled voters outside.13 The challenger at this precinct told me of seeing a 
voter in a wheelchair having to work his way through the punch card ballot while sitting in the rain.  
So intensely did this voter want his vote to count that he returned to the precinct while I was later 
there to make sure that the poll worker receiving his ballot had in fact placed it in the ballot box.  At 
another precinct I saw a young Latina leave the polls distraught because she discovered she was not 
on the precinct list, and this was the second precinct she had visited.  I heard from the challenger 
there that the woman had wanted to ensure that she was at the correct precinct so that her vote would 
count.  She was already late for work but was headed to a third precinct that she was directed to.  
Later I saw her at this third precinct, and she had not been listed there either and was now off to a 
fourth precinct.14 Whatever cynicism is appropriate about the machinations of the voting process 
and system, the deepest impression of the day was the passion to vote manifested by so many in 
Ward 14. 
This subjective and anecdotal impression was confirmed by the vote totals both for Ward 14 
and for Cuyahoga County, which includes the Cleveland metropolitan area.  In Ward 14, John Kerry 
received 4,281 votes, over 73% of the total Ward vote15 and 29% more votes than Democratic 
 
13 Federal law provides protections for voters with disabilities who must vote at 
nonaccessible polling places.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1973ee-1(b)(2)(B)(ii) (requiring that these voters 
be provided an alternative means for casting a ballot). 
14 As became an issue in a lawsuit filed after the election, see supra note 11, large numbers of 
voters could not find their correct precinct due in considerable part to County Board of Election and 
poll worker errors. 
15See http://boe.cuyahogacounty.us/BOE/results/history/2004/110204_GE_Pres_Recount_ 
Canvass. txt [hereinafter 2004 BOE results].    
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5presidential candidate Al Gore received in 2000.16 In Cuyahoga County, Kerry garnered just over 
66% of the total County vote,17 and the 448,503 votes cast in his favor18 were the highest vote total 
ever for a Democratic presidential candidate in this County.19 
The credit for these vote totals goes not only to the passion of voters but to the extensive 
activity to get out the vote established by the Democratic Party and independent groups such as 
MoveOn.  The reports of Ohio being inundated by volunteers from across the country to assist the 
vote effort20 were certainly true.  During the week leading up to the election, I met, as just illustrative 
examples, a man from Seattle who came in to Cleveland and ended up, in the first major election 
support activity of his life, being a prime figure in the establishment of numerous Kerry phone banks. 
 An attorney who had just finished her posting in London and was about to begin a new position in 
Washington, D.C. spent several days at the Cleveland East Side Kerry-Edwards headquarters doing 
 
16 In 2000,  Gore received 973 fewer votes in Ward 14 than Kerry’s 2004 total, for a Gore 
total of 3,308 votes, just under 70% of the votes cast in 2000.  See 
http://boe.cuyahogacounty.us/BOE/results/ history/2000/110700_GE_Canvass.txt [hereinafter 2000 
BOE results]. 
17 See 2004 BOE results, supra note 15. 
18 See id. 
19 Email to Kerry-Edwards volunteers from Mark Griffin, Cuyahoga County Coordinator, 
Ohio Victory 2004, The Coordinated Campaign to Elect John Kerry and John Edwards, Nov. 5, 2004 
(on file with author).  Kerry’s County totals were higher than the totals in the winning campaigns of 
Bill Clinton (1996, 1992), Jimmy Carter (1976), and Lyndon Johnson (1964).  Id. These Kerry totals 
came at a time when the Cuyahoga County population was actually less than in these prior years.  See 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, COUNTY AND CITY DATA BOOK: 2000 (available at www.census.gov/ 
prod/2002pubs/00ccdb/cc00_tabB1.pdf) (County population figures for 2000 and 1990)); 
www.census.gov/population/cencounts/ oh190090.txt (County population figures for 1990, 1980, 
1980, 1970, and 1960). 
20 See, e.g., McCarty & Seper, supra note 5. 
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6whatever work was necessary.  Students from Manhattan came into town the weekend before the 
election to do canvassing and then on election day worked in election protection outside the polls to 
ensure no voter intimidation.  The retired parents of a neighbor across the street came from D.C. also 
to work in election protection outside the polling places.  Over 900 local Democratic challengers and 
supervisors, many of them attorneys, spent the entire election day working polling places in 
Cuyahoga County.21 
The strong organizing effort and voter passion on the Democratic side in Cuyahoga County 
and other parts of Ohio were of course matched by strong organizing efforts and voter passion on the 
Republican side, and the official vote total went in President Bush’s favor in both Ohio22 and the 
nation as a whole.23 What stays with me, though, are the deep passions expressed on both sides that 
led to record turnouts at the polls.24 
These passions present at least two issues for election law analysis.  First, when the past 
several decades have seen low voter turnout in the United States,25 what was different about 2004 
 
21 Telephone interview with Dora Rose, Cuyahoga County Chief of Staff for Election 
Protection (pro bono), Ohio Victory 2004, The Coordinated Campaign to Elect John Kerry and John 
Edwards, October 1, 2005.  There were 843 Democratic challengers and 60 supervisors.  Id. 
22 See supra note 12. 
23 See FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2004 at 5 (reporting that President Bush received 62,040,610 
votes nationwide and John Kerry received 59,028,444) (available at http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/ 
fe2004/federalelections2004.pdf). 
24 See, e.g., www.sos.state.oh/us/sos/ElectionsVoter/electionResults.aspx  (stating that the 
Ohio voter turnout during the November 2004 elections was of record proportions). 
25 This history of lower voter turnout is the subject of significant academic inquiry.  See, e.g., 
RUY A. TEIXEIRA, THE DISAPPEARING AMERICAN VOTER (1992); MARK LAWRENCE KORNBLUH,
WHY AMERICA STOPPED VOTING (2000).   Rational voter theory argues, in fact, that it is rational not 
to vote, because the minimal expected utility of one vote affecting an election.  For a classic 
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7that caused such increases in the presidential votes nationally,26 in Ohio,27 in Cuyahoga County,28 
and in Ward 14?29 As I have already indicated, mobilization of voters by significant organized 
efforts was certainly a prominent factor in 2004, particularly in Ohio.30 Yet the receptivity of voters 
to this mobilization and the very strength of the mobilization efforts themselves bring us back to the 
question of passions, of both voters and activists.  What was there about the 2004 presidential 
election that so impassioned voters to vote?  Both Democrats and Republicans want to understand 
and to capture the motivations that led their supporters – and their opponents -- to the polls. 
A subsidiary question for election law inquiry is why many voters of lower and moderate 
economic means voted Republican.  To date, much of the commentary here accepts that more 
 
statement of this position, see ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 260-76 
(1957).  While I do not address rational voter theory directly, my argument does strongly suggest that 
many more valences are at stake in voting than traditional rational voter theory seems to allow.  For a 
more subtle argument about voting as “rational,” see Richard L. Hasen, Voting Without Law?, 144 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2135 (1996) (assessing the rationality of voting because a social norm). 
26 The 122,295,345 total presidential votes cast nationally in 2004,  see FEDERAL ELECTIONS 
2004, supra  note 23, at 5, were an increase of 16% over the 105,405,100 total presidential votes cast 
nationally in 2000.  See www.fec.gov/pubrec/2000presgeresults.htm. 
27 The 5,627,908 total presidential votes cast in Ohio in 2004, see 2004 Ohio Results, supra  
note 12, were an increase of 23% over the 4,583,767 total presidential votes cast in the state in 2000. 
 See www.sos.state.oh.us/ElectionsVoters/results2000.aspx?Section=234. 
28 The 673,740 total presidential votes cast in Cuyahoga County in 2004,  see 2004 BOE 
results, supra note 15, were an increase of 17% over the 574,77 total presidential votes cast in the 
County in 2000.  See 2000 BOE results, supra note 16.   
29 The 5,646 total presidential votes cast in Ward 14 in 2004, see 2004 BOE results, supra 
note 15, were an increase of 19% over the 4,752 presidential votes cast in the Ward in 2000.  See 
2000 BOE results, supra note 16.   
30 For an argument that the decline in voter participation is due in part to a decline in voter 
mobilization, for example, by political parties, see STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE & JOHN MARK HANSEN,
MOBILIZATION, PARTICIPATION, AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1993). 
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art31
8wealthy Republican voters voted out of economic self-interest but expresses dismay that those lower 
on the economic ladder voted against economic self-interest.  Thomas Frank’s book, What’s the 
Matter with Kansas?  How Conservatives Won the Heart of America,31 is the prototype of this form 
of explanation.  On the first page of his book, Frank writes:  “People getting their fundamental 
interests wrong is what American political life is all about.  This species of derangement is the 
bedrock of our civic order . . . .”32 Those in the lower economic classes who vote Republican engage 
in “self-denying votes”;33 they participate in a “politics of self-delusion.”34 These voters present a 
fury which passes all understanding.35 Frank’s tone is one of incredulity:  how could such false 
belief occur and persist.  One has the sense reading Frank that his dismay lies both with the false 
belief and the failure of right reason – economic insight, for example – to conquer the false belief.  
On the basis of analyses such as his, these Republican voters should move from the shadow world 
described in Plato’s allegory of the cave into the light of true reality,36 but they have not.   
By contrast, I will argue that characterization of the partisan debate as simply one between 
reason and false belief is both unhelpful and inaccurate.  While Democrats may view the Republican 
passions as distortions and mystifications, and Republicans may say the reverse, what needs 
 
31 THOMAS FRANK, WHAT’S THE MATTER WITH KANSAS? HOW CONSERVATIVES WON THE 
HEART OF AMERICA (2004) [hereinafter FRANK, WHAT’S THE MATTER]. 
32 Id. at 1. 
33 Id. at 2. 
34 Id. at 79. 
35 Id. at 111 (“The Fury Which Passeth All Understanding,” title of the book’s section III). 
36 PLATO, REPUBLIC 514a-516d. 
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9explanation is the phenomenon of voter passion as some potentially common characteristic that can 
then be subdivided into its productive or distortive elements.  The two questions posed of election 
law analysis become one:  how can we explain the nature of voters’ passions that motivate them to 
go to the polls?   
 This recontextualization of political debate, I contend, may take place through a revivified 
theory of ideology, and I draw especially on Paul Ricoeur’s Lectures on Ideology and Utopia37 for 
that purpose.  Ricoeur argues that ideology may be defined by three different qualities.  Part I 
describes the first, the more typical conception of ideology as distortion.  Part II establishes the 
second, Ricoeur’s development of the concept of ideology as legitimacy.  The contention is that there 
always exists a gap between the government’s claim to political authority and the citizenry’s belief in 
that authority, and ideology as legitimacy seeks to fill that gap.  Part III offers Ricoeur’s argument 
that the deepest and nonpejorative dimension of ideology lies in its ability to act as integrative, to 
provide identity to an individual or group.  Critical to this assessment is an appreciation that ideology 
rests on the inextricably symbolic structure of action.  Part IV introduces the dimension of ideology 
over time and contrasts ideology and utopia.  Part V returns to explore the implications of ideology 
as a symbolic structure and unfolds on this basis the possibilities of ideological persuasion, change, 
and transformation.  Election law analysis as well as the political parties must come to appreciate 
how both Republican and Democratic stances are ideological in all these senses.  The goal is not to 
provide specific answers to what should be a Democratic or a Republican ideology but to resituate 
 
37 PAUL RICOEUR, LECTURES ON IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA (George H. Taylor ed., 1986) 
[hereinafter RICOEUR, LECTURES].  As evident from my role as editor of this work, it should not be 
surprising that I will be partisan in my invocation of it. 
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art31
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political debate within an ideological framework rather than as one between reason and not.  
Ideology helps explain the range of voters’ passions that inspired them to go to the polls. 
 
I.  Ideology as Distortion 
Characterization of ideology as distortion is the commonplace depiction and requires but 
brief elaboration.  Proceeding from the surface level of analysis downward, Ricoeur says, ideology 
“designates initially some distorting,  dissimulating processes by which an individual or a group 
expresses its situation but without knowing or recognizing it.”38 There is both a disjuncture between 
appearance and reality and a lack of awareness by the adherent that the disjuncture exists.  Thomas 
Frank’s argument fundamentally rests at this level of ideology.  Republican voters of lesser economic 
means are voting against their economic interests.  He describes voting patterns, for example, in 
Johnson County of his home state of Kansas: 
This much is clear . . . from the elections of the last ten years:  those parts of Johnson 
County with the lowest per capita income and lowest median housing values 
consistently generated the strongest support for the conservative faction [of the 
Republican Party].  The areas with the highest income and highest real-estate 
values – Mission Hills and Leawood – were just as reliably loyal to the moderate 
machine.  The more working-class an area is, the more likely it is to be 
conservative.39 
Similarly, in a visit to West Virginia during the 2004 presidential campaign, Frank saw posters for 
President Bush on the most humble of dwellings.  Despite the state’s history of class conflict 
 
38 Id. at 1. 
39 FRANK, WHAT’S THE MATTER, supra note 31, at 104.  Part of the puzzle for Frank is that 
the current voting patterns were reversed thirty years ago, and one hundred years ago the most 
economically desperate areas were the most radical.  “In Kansas, the political geography of social 
class has been turned upside down.”  Id. 
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between miners and mine owners and despite the harm to them of  Bush’s tax cuts and antagonism to 
organized labor, voters Frank spoke with said they were voting Republican because of beliefs about 
abortion and gun control.40 
More generally, critics of Republican policy charge that the current Administration promotes 
its will regardless of social or scientific reality.  In a fall 2004 article that has drawn considerable 
attention,41 Ron Suskind writes of an earlier conversation with an unnamed senior Bush adviser that 
Suskind “now believe[s] gets to the very heart of the Bush presidency.”  The aide criticized those 
like Suskind “‘in . . . the reality-based community,’” that is, those who “‘believe that solutions 
emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality.’” By contrast, for the Administration, 
“[w]e’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality.’”42 The conjunction between 
what is created and actual reality is not an issue.  The Administration’s policy toward the war in Iraq 
is of course a prominent example.  General Tony Zinni writes of the Administration policy leading 
up to and during the war:  “I saw, at a minimum, true dereliction, negligence, and irresponsibility; at 
worst, lying, incompetence, and corruption.  False rationales [were] presented as a justification 
. . . .”43 Similar criticism of the Administration’s resistance to reality is aimed at, for example, its 
 
40 Thomas Frank, What’s the Matter with Liberals?, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, May 12, 2005, at 
46, 48. 
41 See, e.g., Mark Danner, The Secret Way to War, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, June 9, 2005, at 70, 
73 (quoting Suskind, infra note 42). 
42 Ron Suskind, Without a Doubt, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 17, 2004 (available at 
www.nytimes.com and at 2004 WLNR 5575012). 
43 TOM CLANCY, TONY ZINNI & TONY KOLTZ, BATTLE READY 426 (2004). 
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art31
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environmental policy on global warming.44 The Republican ideology, the claim goes, asserts itself 
against reality; it masks and obfuscates reality.  Democrats are ready with facts and figures; 
Republicans rest on faith.  To whatever degree these criticisms are accurate, though, Ricoeur’s 
tripartite analysis of ideology suggests that something more is at stake in current political debate than 
simply the need to address and overcome distortion  or false consciousness.45 Deeper levels of 
ideology are also at work. 
 
II.  Ideology as Legitimation 
Ideology as distortion arises in the political sphere precisely on the basis of its outgrowth 
from ideology’s still deeper levels.  Legitimation, the second form of ideology, acts on the boundary 
between ideology’s first form, as distortion, and its third form, as integration or identification.46 
The problem of the legitimation of authority places us at the turning point between a 
neutral concept of integration and a political concept of distortion.  The degradation, 
the alteration, and the diseases of ideology may originate in our relation to the 
existing system of authority in our society.  Ideology moves beyond mere integration 
to distortion and pathology as it tries to bridge the tension between authority and 
domination.47 
What is the distortive element of legitimation?  Inspired in part by sociologist Max Weber,48 
Ricoeur’s argument here takes several steps.  While it is true that government has the ability to 
 
44 See, e.g., CHRIS MOONEY, THE REPUBLICAN WAR ON SCIENCE (2005). 
45 See, e.g., JOSEPH GABEL, FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS: AN ESSAY ON REIFICATION (Margaret A. 
Thompson trans., 1975). 
46 See infra Part III. 
47 RICOEUR, LECTURES, supra note 37, at 14. 
48 Ricoeur’s principal discussion of legitimacy occur over the course of two lectures on 
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coerce citizenry behavior by force, no system of authority functions by means of force alone.49 
Rather, every political system relies on the citizenry’s belief in the legitimacy of its authority.50 
Obedience to police officers is not simply a result of their physical power to stop, arrest, injure, or 
kill; it is also a consequence of the citizenry’s belief in the officers’ function.51 There is a response 
of belief to the state’s claim of legitimacy.52 Ricoeur’s claim is that this belief in the authority is 
ideological; ideology plays the role here of legitimating authority.53 
Weber.  See id. at 181-215.  Ricoeur is quite overt, though, that his argument here moves 
considerably beyond Weber’s treatment of the topic.  See, e.g., id. at 183, 214-15. 
49 Id. at 154. 
50 Id. at 199.  See, e.g., Ian Buruma, The Indiscreet Charm of Tyranny, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS,
May 12, 2005, at 35, 35: 
[D]ictators cannot rule by terror alone.  Terror is a necessary part of their monopoly 
of power, but not sufficient in itself.  Dictators would only disappear forever if 
people were to give up their willingness, and sometimes even desire, to be ruled by 
them.  But alas, man is weak, especially when faced with a crisis, and his desires are 
easily manipulated. 
See also REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL’S HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON THREATS, CHALLENGES AND 
CHANGE, A MORE SECURE WORLD: OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY 66 (2004) (available at 
www.un.org/secureworld) [hereinafter U.N. PANEL REPORT] (“The effectiveness of the global 
collective security system, as with any other legal order, depends ultimately not only on the legality 
of decisions but also on the common perception of their legitimacy . . . .”). 
Analysis of the role played by legitimation may be extended beyond the functioning of 
governmental power to the power exerted by other organizations, such as corporations.  To what 
degree can executives rule their employees by coercion alone rather than by also seeking employee 
trust?  See, e.g., Joseph Nocera, In Business, Tough Guys Finish Last, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2005, at 
B1 (arguing a recent trend toward the latter). 
51 RICOEUR, LECTURES, supra note 37, at 194. 
52 See id. at 195. 
53 See id. at 13. 
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Legitimation is ideological, because while there should be an equivalence between the claim  
to legitimacy by the authority and the citizenry’s belief in this legitimacy, there is not parity but a 
gap.54 There is always more in the claim to legitimacy than in the citizenry’s spontaneous belief. 
Ideology functions to add a certain surplus-value to our belief in order that our belief 
may meet the requirements of the authority’s claim.  The . . . notion of distortion 
makes more sense if we say that it is always the function of ideology to legitimate a 
claim of legitimacy by adding a supplement to our spontaneous belief.  The function 
of ideology at this stage is to fill the credibility gap in all systems of authority.55 
The equivalence of claim and belief is a cultural fabrication.56 The supplementation of belief is 
“extorted by the claim.”57 
Ricoeur’s contention is that legitimation, the supplementation of belief, is required across all 
systems of political power, even the most rational in appearance.58 Belief is intrinsic, because we 
grant no authority to a political system simply on account of its structure.  We must make a 
commitment to that structure, and that is a belief corresponding to the system’s claim of authority.59 
This belief could be commensurate with the actuality of a system’s claim of rationality, but even 
rational systems go further and create credibility gaps.  A system of formal rules permits distorted 
forms of political behavior, ranging from arbitrariness to bureaucratic detail that clogs and perverts a 
 
54 See id. at 13, 183. 
55 Id. at 183.  See also id. at 202. 
56 Id. at 13. 
57 Id. at 212. 
58 See, e.g., id. at 206. 
59 Id. at 204. 
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system’s goals to irresponsibility that defends itself as obedient to the system.60 Formal rules may 
also serve as a facade that hide the real  sources of power at work in a political regime.61 The 
attempt to preserve the claim that these kinds of authority are rational requires ideological 
supplementation of citizenry belief.62 
Ricoeur asks whether what keeps any political authority not simply legal but a power may be 
finally its retention of the most elemental kind of authority, charismatic authority.63 Ricoeur quotes 
Weber’s definition of the term:  
The term “charisma” will be applied to a certain quality of an individual personality 
by virtue of which he is considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with 
supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities.  
These are such as are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of 
divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is 
treated as a “leader.”64 
Political leaders claim charismatic authority in the sense that they assert a special power to speak a 
truth, and in turn, they seek the citizenry’s belief in that claim.65 The religious overtones of the 
charismatic authority’s claim to truth and to belief in that truth should not be underestimated.66 
60 See id. at 206-7 (citing for the last Hannah Arendt’s work on Adolph Eichmann and the 
authoritarian state). 
61 See id. at 209. 
62 See id. at 207. 
63 See id. at 212. 
64 Id. (quoting 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 242 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich 
eds., 1968)). 
65 RICOEUR, LECTURES, supra note 37, at 212. 
66 See id. 
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Ricoeur poses the question “whether this disjuncture between claim and belief in charismatic 
authority is not the basis for all issues of power and domination in general.”67 
This analysis of legitimation as ideological explains much in current American political life.  
It is a commonplace that President Bush appeals to many social conservative voters because of his 
linking of a conservative religious faith to stances on issues such as abortion and same-sex 
marriage.68 But more is at work here than simply a rational conjunction of the President’s position 
with these voters’ own political and religious perspectives.  Many of these voters have a faith in the 
President, that he is a manifestation of God’s work,69 that he exhibits charismatic authority.  This has 
several consequences.  First, the source of the President’s power for these voters – on the claim that 
he presents – rests on this charismatic authority.  Evidence to support or corroborate the President’s 
claims is a secondary consideration; primary is the power.  These voters judge the President’s worth 
on the basis of “intangibles – character, certainty, fortitude and godliness – rather than on what he 
says or does.”70 At stake here is not only the nature of the claim to authority – that its character is 
 
67 Id. at 212-13.  Cf. Buruma, supra note 50, at 37 (“What has not changed is human nature, 
the human desires that have allowed dictators to emerge in the past.  The wish to worship, to be 
sheltered by a great father, to bask in the reflected glory of war, to be mesmerized by the spectacle of 
power, or swept up in collective emotion, these are still with us.”); ROBERTO CALASSO, THE RUIN OF 
KASCH 312 (1994) (raising in this novel the question of “an unexplored mechanism of the mind 
whereby the word ‘sovereignty’ drags all the gods in its train. . . . A disenchanted sovereignty cannot 
exist . . . . Our entire political future depends on the investigation of such a theorem of sovereignty, 
which is still a long way from seeming evident, convincing, well defined.”). 
68 See Suskind, supra note 42. 
69 See id. 
70 Id. While criticizing the point, Thomas Frank observes how this legitimacy of authority is 
provided other political figures.  “The careers of [present or former members of Congress] Newt 
Gingrich, Henry Hyde, Bob Barr, and Enid Waldholtz are all tainted by revelations of foulest 
hypocrisy.  And yet the suspicions of the rank and file are not aroused.  The power of their shared 
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properly adduced by traits more than those available to empirical evidence – but, a second point, the 
role of belief in response to this claim.  Belief fills in the empirical evidentiary gaps.  There is an 
expectation that one’s faith in the other will be rewarded.  “If you have faith in someone, that person 
is filled like a vessel.  Your faith is the wind beneath his or her wings.”71 Belief offers 
supplementation to the claim.  Third, the claim of a charismatic authority both presumes that it is 
right and requires from its followers faith that it is right.  “The president has demanded 
unquestioning faith from his followers, his staff, his senior aides and his kindred in the Republican 
Party.  Once he makes a decision – often swiftly, based on a creed or moral position – he expects 
complete faith in its rightness.”72 
This interplay of the authority’s claim and  the citizenry’s belief and supplementation of 
belief help explain what for many Democrats is one of the most frustrating aspects of the President’s 
backing:  its seeming imperviousness to facts.  The Administration has well understood that what is 
critical to its support its not the facts as reported in The New York Times but “what most Americans 
are willing to believe.”73 Those who continue to believe – despite the evidence – in a link between 
Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden74 or between Iraq and the 9/11 attacks75 may do so simply 
 
vision of martyrdom is sufficient to overcome any set of facts that are merely material, merely true.”  
FRANK, WHAT’S THE MATTER, supra note 31, at 236. 
71 Suskind, supra note 42. 
72 Id. 
73 Danner, supra note 41, at 73.  I return later to the question of whether Democrats are also 
ideological in finding and interpreting facts in light of their own ideology.  See infra text 
accompanying note 159.  Note too that there may be a difference between facts and facts as reported 
in the Times.
74 See, e.g., GEORGE LAKOFF, DON’T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT! KNOW YOUR VALUES AND 
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because of the Administration’s – the charismatic authority’s – assertion of these facts.76 There may 
be belief that the facts are actually true (which would be ideology as distortion), or that the facts have 
a reality whose proof will yet come true, or that the assertions portray a deeper “truth,” for example, 
the religious war between the Christian West and Islam. 
What this analysis suggests is that to combat the ideology articulated by the President and 
defended by those who believe in him, two alternatives are possible.  Both require Democrats to 
recognize that further compilation of facts contesting the Administration’s positions is not sufficient 
in and of itself.  One alternative is for Democrats to construct a persuasive alternative ideology; I 
later return to this topic.77 The other alternative, which is not pursued by Ricoeur, is to investigate 
how the credibility gap between the President’s claim to authority and his supporters’ belief in this 
authority can become stretched to the breaking point.  At what point will his supporters refuse to 
provide either any longer or in any additional increment supplementation to their belief in the 
President such that they no longer believe in the legitimacy of his authority?  Critical to this 
assessment is the understanding that this decisional point does not rest finally on facts but on belief, 
more precisely, on the loss of belief, the loss of faith.  Facts may be relevant, but they are not 
decisive. 
 
FRAME THE DEBATE 72 (2004) [hereinafter LAKOFF, DON’T THINK] (citing a figure that this belief is 
held by 40% of the American public). 
75 Garry Wills, The Day the Enlightenment Went Out, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2004, at A25 
(citing a poll taken prior to the 2004 election showing that 75% of the President’s supporters held 
this belief). 
76 See LAKOFF, DON’T THINK, supra note 74, at 72. 
77 See infra Part V. 
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Issues that could create such a tipping point,78 either by their singular or cumulative impact, 
are many.  The conduct of the war in Iraq is an obvious example.  The lack of clarity about the 
American mission has become increasingly troublesome to voters, at a time when the costs of lives – 
such as the nineteen reservists from a nearby Cleveland suburb – is increasingly dramatic,79 and the 
course of the war continues to appear chaotic with overtones of a developing civil war.80 “[J]ust as 
politics are a bad motive for choosing a war, so they can be a doomed engine for running a war.”81 
Domestically, the President’s limited and delayed response to the devastation caused by Hurricane 
 
78 See MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: HOW LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG 
DIFFERENCE (2000). 
79 See, e.g., Frank Rich, Someone Tell the President the War is Over, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 
2005, at 13 (citing the reservists’ deaths and the declining approval rate for the President’s handling 
of the war down to 34%). 
80 See, e.g., John F. Burns, If It’s a Civil War, Do We Know It?, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2005, 
§ 4, at 1.  
Other recent evidence has, at least at the time of my writing, apparently not created any 
significant damage on the President.  This evidence includes the Downing Street memo and the 
Administration’s attack on former ambassador Joseph C. Wilson IV.  The Downing Street Memo 
showed the Administration’s apparent decision to go to war in Iraq some eight months prior to the 
war’s actual beginning.  See The Secret Downing Street Memo, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, June 9, 2005, 
at 71.  This decision contradicted the Administration’s public claim that the final decision rested on 
facts accumulated up to the war’s beginning including, of course, the “fact” of Iraq’s having weapons 
of mass destruction.  See Danner, supra note 41.  Danner acknowledges “Americans’ lack of interest 
in what [the memo] shows.”  Id. at 73. 
In the Wilson case, Administration officials leaked the name of the ambassador’s wife, 
Valerie (Plame) Wilson, as an undercover C.I.A. agent, in apparent retaliation for Wilson’s public 
criticism of the Administration’s twisting of prewar evidence about Iraq’s nuclear program.  See 
Richard W. Stevenson, For Bush, Effect of Investigation of C.I.A. Leak Case is Uncertain, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 24, 2005, at 1.  Democrats thought the case would help raise issues about the credibility 
of the President’s decision to go to war.  See id. See also Scott Shane, Ex-Diplomat’s Surprise 
Volley on Iraq Drove White House into Political Warfare Mode, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2005, at 19.  
That these situations have apparently not injured the President is, of course, consistent with 
my larger thesis, that ideological belief does not rest finally on facts alone. 
81 Rich, supra note 79, at 13. 
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Katrina has raised questions about his leadership and whether trust in this leadership continues to be 
justified.82 The indictment of Republican House majority leader Tom DeLay and ethical issues 
facing various other prominent Republicans may also present a historical moment where belief in 
Republican authority may start to diverge markedly from the claim to authority.83 The President’s 
nomination to the Supreme Court is causing disaffection from social conservatives that may shatter 
the Republican coalition.84 Less immediately visible but potentially significant domestic problems 
for the President include the health of the economy given rising deficits85 and growing trade 
 
82 See, e.g., Richard W. Stevenson, The President From 9/11 Has Yet to Reappear, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 9, 2005, at A19 (raising these issues).   See also Actually, It Was FEMA’s Job 
[editorial], N. Y. Times, Oct. 2, 2005, §  4, at 11 (criticizing FEMA’s attempts to deflect criticism for 
poor performance onto local and state authorities).  
83 See, e.g., Robin Toner, For Republicans, a Swelling Sea of Troubles, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 
2005, at A1 (reporting on the DeLay indictment, the investigation into stock dealings of Republican 
Senate majority leader Bill Frist, the indictment of Republican lobbyist Jack Abramoff, and the arrest 
of former White House budget official David H. Safavian on charges of lying and obstruction of a 
federal inquiry). 
84See, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick, Wink and a Prayer:  The Crisis of the Bush Code, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2005, § 4, at 1.  The social conservative concern is not only that Miers is not herself 
sufficiently conservative but that the President did not deem it sufficiently important to provide a 
more clearly and overtly conservative nominee.  In the words of conservative commentator George 
Will, the President is asking his constituency simply to “trust” him, and conservatives are now 
openly questioning whether that trust is warranted.  See  George F. Will, Bush Wallows in Identity 
Politics by Nominating Harriet Miers, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 6, 2005, at B7 (available at 
2005 WLNR 16205733).  Those who have believed in the President may find too big a gap between 
the claim to legitimacy and the belief required.   Even if Miers’s nomination is successful, that may 
not repair the loss of faith in the President by social conservatives.  See Kirkpatrick, supra, at 1 
(“some conservatives say the damage has already been done to Mr. Bush’s Republican base”).   
85 Even prior to Hurricane Katrina and the costs it will impose on the economy and the 
federal budget, concerns have been raised about the Administration’s budget calculations, which 
have not included the costs in 2007 and afterwards of continuing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan or 
of showing how various forms of tax relief the Administration has proposed will be achieved.  To 
take just one example, it is projected that the cost of an Administration tax panel’s proposal to repeal 
the alternative minimum tax would be $1.2 trillion over ten years.  See Deficit Disorder, N.Y. TIMES,
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
21
imbalances.86 If it proves to be the case that “as time goes on and the gap grows between what 
Americans see and what they are told,”87 then the disparity between the President’s claim to authority 
and the people’s belief in that authority may become too great.  A sense may arise of a betrayal of 
trust.88 Although this loss of belief, loss of faith, may not affect the formal, legal legitimacy of the 
Administration’s authority, it may end the political legitimacy of its authority. 
 
III.  Ideology as Integration 
Ricoeur argues that we cannot rid ourselves of ideology, but we can locate a “nonpejorative 
concept of ideology as integration.”89 Integration here entails not its customary sense in 
contemporary American law as racial integration but consists rather as a concept of identity for an 
individual or group, a constitutive, integrative function.90 The existence of this constitutive function 
 
July 24, 2005, § 4, at 11 (editorial). 
86 See, e.g., William Greider, America’s Truth Deficit, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2005, at 13:  
“Our economy’s international debt position – accumulated from many years of tolerating larger and 
larger trade deficits – began compounding ferociously in the last five years.  Our net foreign 
indebtedness is now more than 25 percent of gross domestic product and at the current pace will 
reach 50 percent in four or five years.”  Among the concerns is that a significant number of foreign 
investors in the United States will come to conclude that the health of the U.S. economy is at risk and 
pull their money and invest elsewhere, to the significant shock to the American economy.  See, e.g.,
David E. Sanger, Mark Landler & Keith Bradsher, Dollar’s Slide Adding to Tensions U.S. Faces 
Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2005, at C1. 
87 Danner, supra note 41, at 74. 
88 LAKOFF, DON’T THINK, supra note 74, at 77 (“[L]ying in itself is not and should not be the 
issue.  The real issue is a betrayal of trust.”). 
89 RICOEUR, LECTURES, supra note 37, at 253. 
90 See id. at 158. 
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can be derived from ideology’s other two functions.  It is the condition of possibility for the process 
of distortion;91 it is “something that can be distorted.”92 It is also “something within which lies the 
process of legitimation.”93 It is the source of a constitutive belief that can become distorted in the 
supplementation of belief required to fill the gap between the claim to legitimate authority and the 
belief in this authority.94 That ideology as integrative can be distorted and can be the source of a 
constitutive belief also tells us something fundamental about its own composition.  It originates at 
the level of the symbolic structure of action.95 “[A]ction itself is symbolic in the sense that it is 
construed on the basis of fundamental symbols.”96 For Ricoeur, this symbolic structure of action is 
ineluctable.  “[T]here is no social action which is not already symbolically mediated. . . . [S]ymbolic 
systems belong already to the infrastructure, to the basic constitution of human being.”97 Using 
analogous vocabulary, Ricoeur argues that ideology as integrative “is not the distortion of 
communication but the rhetoric of basic communication.  There is a rhetoric of basic communication 
because we cannot exclude rhetorical devices from language; they are an intrinsic part of ordinary 
language.”98 Human social, cultural, or political action is never simply a brute fact; it exists always 
 
91 See id. at 155. 
92 Id. at 255. 
93 Id. 
94 See id. at 204. 
95 Id. at 253. 
96 Id. at 256. 
97 Id. at 258. 
98 Id. at 259.  In Part V infra, I return to some of the implications of these emphases on the 
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within and as part of a symbolic structure.  Distortion would not appear were there not a symbolic 
structure of action that could be distorted.99 As integrative, ideology has a function broader than 
politics; the constitutive relationship is social, not just political.100 Finally, the integrative function 
supports group identity not only in the contemporary space but also over time, backwards in 
memory101 and forwards as a prospective identity.102 
Part of the great insight of Ricoeur’s delineation of ideology as integrative is that it makes 
apparent that individual or social group identification takes place on the basis of symbolic or 
rhetorical values that may diverge from economic criteria.  No longer is economic reasoning 
necessarily basic to human identity; other values may well hold integrative sway.  Let me provide an 
example.  In his prolific and probing work, Derrick Bell expresses dismay that Whites of modest or 
meager means have not seen that their economic interests could be enhanced by alliance with Blacks 
of similar plight.103 Instead, these Whites have acted against their economic interests.104 Why?  Bell 
argues that these Whites have asserted a property right in Whiteness that provides them a superior 
 
structure of symbolic action and the rhetoric of basic communication. 
99 Id. at 263. 
100 Id. at 260. 
101 See id. at 261. 
102 See id. at 311.  I return to this temporal dimension of identity in Part IV. 
103 See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL 
JUSTICE 162-65 (1987) [hereinafter BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED]. 
104 See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES 8 (1998) [hereinafter BELL,
AFROLANTICA LEGACIES]. 
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status over Blacks.105 They prioritize this sense of individual and group White identity despite it 
being economically dysfunctional.106 While Bell strenuously rejects the property right in Whiteness 
and harshly criticizes its dire effects on prolonging Black racial subordination, he recognizes its 
separability from economic interests and the power of identity it provides to Whites. 
Two points are worthy of consideration here.  First, one may well criticize an ideology from 
an external perspective as distortive or illegitimate but may still acknowledge the positive, 
integrative value it has for its adherents.  Second, the analysis reveals again that objection to an 
ideology must rest not finally on facts but at the level of rhetoric and symbolic structure.  Facts can 
be incorporated into the argument at the level of symbolic structure but usually do not suffice on 
their own.  Sometimes the objection to an ideology may take the role of a critique internal to the 
ideology’s own values; more typically, the critique will need to propose a more persuasive 
alternative ideology.  Let me return to the work of Thomas Frank to expand on both of these points. 
As previously mentioned,107 Frank’s principal critique is that in places such as his home state 
of Kansas, individuals of lesser economic means have swung to the Republican column in support of 
a distortive ideology that works against their economic benefit.  He describes “a crusade in which 
one’s material interests are suspended in favor of vague cultural grievances that are all-important and 
 
105 See, e.g., BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note 103, at 137. 
106 In other work I have examined Bell’s writings at greater length.  See George H. Taylor, 
Derrick Bell’s Narratives as Parables, N.Y.U. REV. LAW & SOC. CHANGE (forthcoming 2006) 
[hereinafter Taylor, Derrick Bell’s Narratives]; Racism as “The Nation’s Crucial Sin”:  Theology 
and Derrick Bell, 9 MICH. J. RACE & LAW 269 (2004) [hereinafter Taylor, Racism as “The Nation’s 
Crucial Sin”], reprinted in THE DERRICK BELL READER 433 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 
2005). 
107 See supra Part I. 
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yet incapable of every being assuaged.”108 He recalls a newspaper article about a locale “‘where 
hatred trumps bread,’” where “unassuageable cultural grievances are elevated inexplicably over solid 
material ones, and basic economic self-interest is eclipsed by juicy myths of national authenticity and 
righteousness wronged.”109 While the article’s focus was the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Frank 
immediately thinks of the report’s applicability to Kansas.110 He views in his home state a 
“landscape of distortion, of paranoia, and of good people led astray.”111 The Republican ideology is 
simply a distortive one. 
Yet in the midst of this critique, Frank acknowledges at point the positive value that the 
Republican ideology provides to those who subscribe to it.  It offers “a general way of understanding 
the buzzing mass-cultural world we inhabit,”112 an “airtight explanation of reality,” an “ability to 
make sense of the average person’s disgruntlement,”113 “a ready-made identity.”114 Early in the book 
Frank acknowledges the conservative moment’s “power as an idea and its broad popular vitality,”115 
108 FRANK, WHAT’S THE MATTER, supra note 31, at 121.  In Part IV infra, I return to his claim 
that this ideology is not assuaged. 
109 Id. at 239. 
110 Id. (In his text, Frank indicates that the newspaper article came from The Wall Street 
Journal, see id., but his notes provide no more specific reference as to date or page.) 
111 Id. at 242. 
112 Id. at 240. 
113 Id. at 162. 
114 Id. at 157. 
115 Id. at 8. 
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but to him this power remains false and distortive; it furnishes “pseudospiritual goods.”116 Frank 
spends several pages describing the political activities of Tim Golba, a blue collar worker at a Pepsi 
bottling plant who has built the organization Kansas for Life into a powerful political base that has 
made significant inroads into the state Republican party and had considerable electoral success.117 
Frank acknowledges Golba’s “monastic lifestyle” and the tremendous personal and material 
sacrifices he has made to move his organization forward.118 Frank writes of Gotha, “Ignoring one’s 
economic self-interest may seem like a suicidal move to you and me, but viewed a different way it is 
an act of noble self-denial; a sacrifice for a holier cause.”  Yet Frank concludes that Golba’s self-
sacrifice has operated only as an “upside-down” version of the farmworker organizer Cesar Chavez: 
selfless toil but to make the economically powerful even more powerful.119 What is remarkable is 
both Frank’s continuing insistence that the denial of economic self-interest is nonsensical and his 
unwillingness to acknowledge that Golba is providing for himself and the members of his 
organization a very powerful form of self-identity that is separable from economic self-interest. 
Reflection on Frank’s work recapitulates the principal insights about ideology as integrative.  
First, while liberals may well view the conservative ideology expressed by Golba and others as 
distortive, liberals also need to appreciate that it presents a coherent, integrative ideology to its 
followers.  Second, the proper baseline for comprehension and criticism of ideologies rests not on 
economic self-interest or economic fact but on a symbolic structure of beliefs, norms, and values (of 
 
116 Id. at 242. 
117 Id. at 166-69. 
118 Id. at 168. 
119 Id. at 169. 
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which economic interests may be one).  Criticism must proceed finally not on the basis of fact but on 
the presentation of an alternative, more persuasive integrative ideology. 
On the American political scene, ideas similar to these have recently been expressed most 
lucidly by George Lakoff.  Lakoff too argues that people vote more on the basis of their values and 
sense of identity than on the basis of their economic self-interest. 
It is not that people never care about their self-interest.  But they vote their identity.  
And if their identity fits their self-interest, they will vote for that.  It is important to 
understand this point.  It is a serious mistake to assume that people are simply always 
voting in their self-interest.120 
It is not contradictory, for example, for conservatives to vote against their economic self-interest in 
favor of strict crime legislation that will put more people in prison and entail significantly high 
prison costs if that vote is consistent with their conservative views on crime and morality.121 It is not 
contradictory for lower and middle class conservatives to agree with President Bush’s tax cut even 
though they would disproportionately bear its cost and its principal benefit would go to the rich if 
these voters believe that the economic activity of the rich should not be unjustly burdened.122 Lakoff 
agrees with Ricoeur both that conservative voters may grant priority to individual or group identity 
rather than economic self-interest and that this identity is a coherent, integrative ideology in these 
voters’ mind.123 Whatever distortions liberals find in conservative ideology, they must also seek to 
 
120 LAKOFF, DON’T THINK, supra note 74, at 19.  See also id. at 39, 87. 
121 See GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: HOW LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES THINK 144 
(2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS]. 
122 See id. 398; LAKOFF, DON’T THINK, supra note 74, at 18-19.  A number of these voters 
also believe that these tax cuts may be in their own long-term economic self-interest, as they expect 
someday to be wealthy themselves.  See id.; LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS, supra note 121, at 398.  
123 See id. at 147. 
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understand conservative norms and the basis for these norms on their own terms.124 Simple 
“demonization”125 of conservative voters misses the moral understanding126 necessary to begin any 
successful effort to move these voters to vote differently in the future.  Most primordially, Lakoff 
argues, liberals must comprehend, as conservatives have, the real bases upon which politics 
proceeds: 
As long as liberals ignore the moral, mythic, and emotional dimension of politics, as 
long as they stick to policy and interest groups and issue-by-issue debate, they will 
have no hope of understanding the nature of the political transformation that has 
overtaken this country and they will have no hope of changing it.127 
In Ricoeur’s terms, liberals need to grasp the positive, integrative dimensions of ideology as well as 
the distortive. 
What is, according to Lakoff, the positive conservative political model?  He draws upon 
metaphors of the family and contrasts a liberal “Nurturant Parent” morality with a conservative 
“Strict Father” morality.128 “In the Strict Father model of the family, the father is the parental 
authority who sets strict rules for what counts as right and wrong. . . . Strict Father morality requires 
that there are natural, strict, uniform, unchanging standards of behavior that must be followed if 
 
124 See LAKOFF, DON’T THINK, supra note 74, at 17 (“There are certainly cases where 
conservatives have lied. . . . However it is equally important to recognize that many of the ideas that 
outrage progressives are what conservatives see as truths – presented from their point of view.”). 
125 LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS, supra note 121 at 147. 
126 Id. at 321 (“Pathological stereotyping may serve self-righteousness and propaganda, but it 
misses all moral understanding.”). 
127 Id. at 19 (emphasis added). 
128 Id. at 13. 
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society is to function.”129 The system is then rule-based and provides clarity and certainty as to 
norms.  “Self-discipline, self-reliance, and respect for legitimate authority” are crucial.130 The Strict 
Father model has direct implications for social policy, ranging from attitudes toward crime131 to 
stances on foreign policy.  In foreign policy, for example, the United States should itself act as the 
Strict Father:  it knows what is right, knows what is the right thing to do, and has the moral authority 
to require right action from others and the power to enforce this right behavior.132 Conservative 
political activists can promote voters’ receptivity to the Strict Father model in times of war or 
terror,133 and they can also move those perhaps not previously inclined to economic conservatism by 
appeal to the Strict Father morality found in these individuals’ own personal or religious lives.134 
Lakoff spends similarly many pages on the liberal Nurturant Family135 and its model of parental care 
and communication that lead children to become responsible adults.136 He argues that liberals “do 
not fully comprehend the moral unity of their own politics and the role that the family plays in it,” 
 
129 Id. at 90. 
130 Id. at 66 (discussing specifically individual growth). 
131 See, e.g., id. at 90. 
132 See LAKOFF, DON’T THINK, supra note 74, at 10; LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS, supra note 
121, at 413. 
133 LAKOFF, DON’T THINK, supra note 74, at 42.  A question here is whether one of the 
reasons some conservative politicians have promoted, for example, the war in Iraq is for the 
instrumental purpose of inculcating further voter attachment to a Strict Father political model. 
134 See id. at 87; LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS, supra note 121, at 16. 
135 See id. at 108-40. 
136 See, e.g., id. at 108-09. 
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and they do not appreciate that this model must be developed politically for there to be any national 
future of liberal political success.137 
Lakoff’s model of analysis helpfully defines elements of a positive conservative ideological 
identity.  By contrast, Ricoeur’s theory of ideology does not much attend the details of a liberal or 
conservative ideology but is instead oriented toward grounding the theory of ideology in general.  
While Lakoff’s theory rests on sociological and linguistic emphases about family structure,138 
Ricoeur’s theory goes beyond Lakoff’s in its very attention to ideology as a political phenomenon.  
Further, Ricoeur provides a linkage between the three dimensions of ideology – as distortion, 
legitimation, and identification or integration – while Lakoff discusses only the first and third and 
discusses them separately.  Ricoeur’s attention to the question of the legitimacy of authority and the 
seemingly inextricable role of charismatic qualities in any form of legitimate authority139 deepens 
Lakoff’s assessment of the political “father” figure.  Ricoeur’s discussion of the religious overtones 
of authority being charismatic – it is godlike, exemplary140 – extends beyond Lakoff the dimensions 
of both the claims to truth and belief in the truth of that political father.  Finally, it is provocative that 
 
137 Id. at 18-19.  Thomas Frank is very much in agreement.  The failure of liberals to  
persuade voters of the merits of the liberal model “deserves a large part of the blame” for recent 
conservative success.  FRANK, WHAT’S THE MATTER, supra note 31, at 242. 
138 He only briefly uses the vocabulary of ideology.  See LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS, supra 
note 121, at 14-16 (describing the coherence of conservative and liberal ideologies). 
139 See supra text accompanying note 63. 
140 See supra text accompanying note 64. 
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for Ricoeur the charismatic qualities of authority apply across all claims to power,141 including both 
liberal and conservative. 
My ultimate concern, though, lies less with differences between Lakoff and Ricoeur than with 
what they hold in common:  that political identity rests at bottom not on economic self-interest but 
on what for Ricoeur are the symbolic structures of individual and group integration142 and for Lakoff 
are “the moral, mythic, and emotional dimension of politics.”143 Why is it a surprise to people like 
Thomas Frank that many voters do not cast votes simply on the basis of economic self-interest?  A 
critique of Frank’s book asks in the form of satire:  isn’t it baffling that upper class voters from New 
York City’s Central Park West voted in the 2004 presidential election not in favor of the 
(Republican) candidate who offered them tax cuts but overwhelmingly in favor of the (Democratic) 
candidate who would have taken them away?144 Isn’t much of the liberal ideology in favor of civil 
rights an argument that Whites should give up some economic benefits to allow others to be at the 
political table, and isn’t much of the continuing travails of the movement for civil rights a result of a 
number of Whites being willing to pay an economic cost – in the form of flight to the suburbs or 
placement of their children in private schools145 – to maintain certain ideological values of racial 
 
141 See supra text accompanying note 67. 
142 See supra text accompanying notes 95-97. 
143 LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS, supra note 121, at 19. 
144 See Walter Shapiro, What’s the Matter with Central Park West?, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Mar. 2005, at 46. 
145 See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 717-19 (5th ed. 1998) (making 
this argument). 
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identity?146 May we not generalize to the recent history of  nationalist, ethnic, and religious 
conflicts?  As Raymond Aron wrote in 1958, in the context of criticizing the war between his native 
France and its then-colony Algeria:  “We would have to deny the experience of the century to believe 
that men will sacrifice their passions for their interests.”147 In our more modest context, Democrats 
must understand the ideological bases of identity in order to comprehend, combat, and form an 
alternative to what has been the development of a very effective conservative ideological identity. 
 
IV.  Ideology and Utopia 
There is a final characteristic of ideology as integrative that deserves separate attention: its 
definition of success over historical time.  My inquiry here is sparked by Frank’s depiction of 
conservative ideology as “a crusade in which one’s material interests are suspended in favor of vague 
cultural grievances that are all-important and yet incapable of ever being assuaged.”148 This brief 
comment summarizes the two main points of Frank’s critique.  First, lower and middle class 
conservatives vote against their economic interest in favor of noneconomic norms.  Part III tried to 
make sense of the potential viability of this orientation toward a positive ideological identity and 
argued its relevance for both liberals and conservatives.  Frank’s second criticism is that the 
 
146 See supra text accompanying note 106 (discussing Derrick Bell’s thesis that many Whites 
assert a property right in Whiteness).  More generally, economists are starting to discuss how 
identity – as a form of “nonpecuniary motivation[]” – can affect economic outcomes, rather than just 
simply the reverse.  See, e.g., George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, Economics and Identity, 115
Q.J. ECONOMICS 715, 748 (2000) (emphasis added).  For example, women upsetting prevalent norms 
of gender identity by working in traditionally male occupations may receive less assistance from their 
male coworkers, creating economic disutility.  Id. at 723. 
147 RAYMOND ARON, L’ALGÉRIE ET LA RÉPUBLIQUE 37 (1958) (“Il faut nier l’expérience du 
siècle pour croire que les hommes sacrifient leurs passions à leur intérêt.”) (my translation). 
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conservative norms are “incapable of being assuaged.”  For example, anti-abortion activists Frank 
has talked with acknowledge that abortions won’t end “without a fundamental shift on the Supreme 
Court” in the indefinite future.149 When we find lower and middle class conservatives organizing to 
advance social goals that will not be achieved and at the same time voting to advance Republican 
economic goals that will disserve their economic interests, this for Frank is the distortive 
conservative ideology.   
In my view, Frank not only fails to address the positive nature of ideological norms, he also 
fails to comprehend how political activists – of both right and left – can intelligently respond to his 
criticism that an ideology fails because its goals are not capable of apparent achievement.  If on the 
issue of the potentially positive character of ideology his perspective is limited because it prioritizes 
economic self-interest over an integrative ideology, on the issue of an ideology’s success his 
perspective is again limited because it touts present “fact” over ideology.  Two responses are 
available to this latter claim; the first addresses the issue of success in the short-term, the second in 
the long-term.  As to the first, an ideology’s lack of success in the near term is not fatal in the views 
of its adherents, because the activists believe they are nevertheless doing the right thing.  They are 
acting with integrity, in consistency with more transcendent norms.150 In discussing his 
 
148 FRANK, WHAT’S THE MATTER, supra note 31, at 121.  For a prior quotation of this 
passage, see supra text accompanying note 99. 
149 Id. at 96.  Because we are currently faced with the ascension of two new Justices to the 
Court, this shift may possibly arise in within a more immediate historical future and reveal the 
inadequacy of Frank’s own sense of historical fact and possibility.  Nevertheless, for the sake of 
unfolding the utopian aspects of ideological thinking, I retain Frank’s assumption that historical 
change of the type wanted by either strong liberals or strong conservatives is not soon forthcoming. 
150 Some activists, of course, believe they are in fact doing God’s work.  See, e.g., id. at 95 
(“‘The other side doesn’t have an agenda . . . . We have an agenda – the kingdom of God.’”) (quoting 
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conversations with some conservative activists, Frank acknowledges this claim, but his rejoinder is 
sarcastic:  “The O’Connors themselves may not stand to gain much from, say, a cut in top marginal 
income tax rates, but there is still joy in doing what is right, in being part of a movement that is 
advancing so robustly toward its goals.”151 By comparison, on the liberal left, Derrick Bell thinks 
that acting rightly is worth writing a book with the apt title Ethical Ambition:  Living a Life of 
Meaning and Worth,152 and my colleague Jules Lobel has written his own book, again with the apt 
title of Success Without Victory: Lost Legal Battles and the Long Road to Justice in America.153 
Frank also fails to incorporate ideologies’ orientation toward success in the future, which is 
another aspect of the integrative role of ideology.  In this case, Frank fails to comprehend how 
ideologies are potentially not undercut by present facts, because their fulfilment lies ahead in time.  
Ricoeur, for example, criticizes the sacralization of success; an idea may succeed in the short term 
not necessarily because it is good, and what history condemns now may return later to more 
 
a conservative activist). 
151 Id. at 172-73.  The sarcasm of the comment is apparent in light of Frank’s denial that the 
conservative moment is advancing toward its social goals.  See supra text accompanying note 140. 
152 DERRICK BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION: LIVING A LIFE OF MEANING AND WORTH (2002).  See,
e.g., id. at 5 (“[M]y primary goal has been to live an ethical life . . . . That means I try to choose the 
ethical route even when defeat rather than success may wait at the end of the road.”).  I address this 
component of Bell’s work and life at greater length elsewhere.  See Taylor, Racism as “The Nation’s 
Crucial Sin,” supra note 106, at 284-85.  
153 JULES LOBEL, SUCCESS WITHOUT VICTORY: LOST LEGAL BATTLES AND THE LONG ROAD 
TO JUSTICE IN AMERICA (2003).  See, e.g., id. at 7 (“Success inheres in the creation of a tradition, of a 
commitment to struggle, of a narrative of resistance that can inspire others similarly to resist.”); 266 
(rejecting Athe dominant American view that success and failure can be measured by short-term 
consequences). 
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favorable reception.154 The most dramatic examples of future-oriented ideologies155 are messianic: 
in end times, the kingdom of God will arrive and overturn current materialistic and profane norms 
and oppressions.  Conservative religious ideologies are of course the most prominent example of this 
orientation on the present political stage,156 but there is a similar faith in the perdurance and 
sustenance of ultimate religious truths as over against existent reality in the work of Bell and the 
traditions of his enslaved ancestors.157 Lobel, also writing from the left, speaks of a spirituality that 
is not messianic but “a faith in human potential [stemming] from a deeply Jewish identification with 
people’s suffering and resistance.”158 In these diverse approaches, present facts are not 
determinative.  We might as well speak, for example, of a liberal faith (not necessarily religious)  in 
racial integration:  a faith in a future that present facts also belie.159 Liberals, who have despaired 
 
154 See RICOEUR, LECTURES, supra note 37, at 179. 
155 I trust it is apparent by this point that my use of the term “ideologies” in this context is 
nonpejorative and shorthand for integrative ideologies. 
156 See, e.g., supra note 150. 
157 See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF 
RACISM 195 (1992) (describing as the faith of these ancestors a belief that “evil and suffering were 
not the extent of their destiny – or of the destiny of those who would follow them”).  For an 
argument that these sentiments appear also to reflect Bell’s own faith, see Taylor, Racism as “The 
Nation’s Crucial Sin,” supra note 106, at 319-20. 
158 LOBEL, supra note 153, at 48.  At points throughout his book, Lobel remarks on the 
religious or spiritual faith of those litigating and organizing against existent norms.  See, e.g., id. at 
49 & 106. 
159 As is well known, Bell is very critical of this tenet of liberal political faith.  The Supreme 
Court’s judgment in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), requiring an end to state-
sponsored segregation, is a decision society is “increasingly willing to commemorate, and less and 
less willing to follow.”  BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 104, at 49.  For Bell, the liberal 
ideology is distortive and inattentive to facts: racial integration is not occurring.  He has long argued 
that in education the focus by Blacks should be on quality education rather than on the unavailing 
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over the conservative failure to face the facts,160 must acknowledge that their own normative 
ideology does not so much refute present facts about the lack in particular of school integration but 
retains a faith in a different future where present facts will fall away. 
The vocabulary of faith here – and its direct or analogous invocation of religious faith – may 
elicit greater receptivity to a nonpejorative ideology that is coherent and defensible in its orientation 
to the future rather than to determination by present fact.  Ricoeur further enlarges the scope of the 
analysis of futurity by introducing the concept of utopia and discussing its interrelation with 
ideology. 
The ruling symbols of our identity derive not only from our present and our past but 
also from our expectations for the future. . . . What I call the identity of a community 
or of an individual is also a prospective identity.  The identity is in suspense.  Thus, 
the utopian element is ultimately a component of identity.  What we call ourselves is 
also what we expect and yet what we are not.161 
A prospective identity is utopian; it is something that is not yet but may be.162 In the best sense of 
the term, a utopia explores the possible,163 opens the possible,164 “extends to the boundary line 
 
school integration.  See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters:  Integration Ideal and Client 
Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976). 
160 See supra text accompanying notes 39-44. 
161 RICOEUR, LECTURES, supra note 37, at 311 (emphasis added).  Broadening the analysis 
even further, Ricoeur describes the role of utopia as imaginative and contends that the role of 
imagination here is constitutive of identity.  Id. Ricoeur engages in a more detailed elaboration of a 
theory of imagination in his lectures on that subject, see Paul Ricoeur, Lectures on Imagination 
(1975) (unpublished lectures, transcription on file with author), and I explore those lectures at greater 
length elsewhere.  See George H. Taylor, Legal Consciousness and Ricoeur’s Theory of Imagination 
(2005) (manuscript on file with author). 
162 As an attention to what may be, the utopian is broader than faith, which believes in what 
will be. 
163 RICOEUR, LECTURES, supra note 37, at 310. 
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between the possible and the impossible.”165 From its perspective as the “elsewhere,”166 the utopian 
offers a perspective allowing critique of the existing order.167 In opening up the possible, the utopian 
can also act to shatter the present order.168 The utopian can provide to a society new goals.169 “We 
speak of humanity not only as a species but as in fact a task, since humanity is given nowhere.  The 
utopian element may be the notion of humanity that we are directed toward and that we unceasingly 
attempt to bring to life.”170 Criticism of an integrative ideology – whether conservative or liberal – 
on the basis of existing facts is insufficient, because this criticism misses the aspirational, 
prospective element of an integrative ideology, an element that anticipates, opens itself to, and works 
for the realization of possibilities that may transform existing facts.171 
If the best side of utopia – its exploration of the possible – aligns itself with the best side of 
ideology – as integrative – so can other traits of utopia parallel ideology’s other two general 
characteristics, as legitimation and as distortion.  Ideology as legitimation can be matched with 
utopia’s efforts to offer “alternative ways to deal with authority and power,”172 whether as alternative 
 
164 Id. at 182. 
165 Id. at 253. 
166 See id. at 17. 
167 See id. at 55. 
168 Id. at 179. 
169 Id. at 283. 
170 Id. at 253. 
171 Note that a conservative utopia that wants to restore the past is still utopian in the sense 
that it seeks to open future possibilities in order to transform the present.  See, e.g., id. at 275. 
172 Id. at 179. 
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forms of powers or alternatives to power altogether.173 If the pathology of ideology is distortion, “the 
pathology of utopia is escape,” the creation of a complete gap between the present and the future that 
allows the utopia to rid itself of the complexities of political decision, authority, and power.174 In 
this utopia, all goals are possible and compatible.175 Utopia here is fancy, something completely 
impossible, unrealizable.176 
The traits of ideology and utopia can also be juxtaposed in order to correct each other.  
Utopia as the possible can shatter the complacency of an existing ideology that is content with what 
is and perhaps unable to conceive any better future for humanity elsewhere.177 Where ideology acts 
to add the surplus-value to belief that legitimates the present system of order, utopia can “unmask[] 
this surplus-value” and offer alternate ways to govern.178 Similarly, though this is not a direction 
Ricoeur himself pursues, ideology can pose the tested traditions and hard-won compromises of an 
existing order against the untested and perhaps fanciful possibilities of political authority, judgment, 
and power offered by a utopia.179 
173 Id. at 310. 
174 Id. at 17. 
175 See id. at 296. 
176 Id. at 310.  See also Buruma, supra note 50, at 35 (“Dictators embark on great missions, 
while the plans of politicians are inevitably crippled by shabby compromises.  This view has been 
shared by too many intellectuals in the past, who fell under the spell of absolute power.  It is the fatal 
romanticism that justifies unlimited murder.”). 
177 See id. at 17. 
178 Id. at 298.  See also id. at 192. 
179 Ricoeur’s tripartite division of utopia allows resuscitation of the term against more limited 
conceptions that are currently popular.  In a recent article, for example, Edward Rothstein criticizes 
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For our purposes, analysis of utopia offers at least three insights.  First, an ideology cannot be 
undermined simply because of its deviation from existing fact; those facts may change in the future.  
Second, liberal as well as conservative ideologies rest on something other than mere fact;  both 
express certain faiths that go beyond present fact, both project prospective identities, both exhibit 
utopian elements.  Third, criticism of an ideology cannot rest on its opposition to existing reality, 
present fact.  Not only is an ideology prospective, and so resistant to subsumption under present 
facts, but an ideology incorporates facts within its larger symbolic structure.  At bottom, an ideology 
rests on its symbolic structure, and facts are but elements within this symbolic structure.  I develop 
the larger implications of ideology as a symbolic structure in the Part that follows. 
 
V.  Ideology as a Symbolic Structure 
To explore the dimensions of ideology as a symbolic structure, we return to the primordial 
argument in Ricoeur’s theory of ideology: “[T]here is no social action which is not already 
 
invocation of utopia, because of its escapist quality: it is absolutist and “must stand outside of earthly 
history.”  Edward Rothstein, Well, Wouldn’t It Be Pretty to Think So?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2005, at 
B6.  “When commentators call the push for democratic transformation in the Middle East utopian,” 
he adds, “they do not mean that it provides an ideal toward which reformers can aim; they mean it is 
a hopeless, unrealistic goal for American policy.”  Id. Others have charged that the call for free 
market globalization is utopian.  See, e.g., John Gray, The World is Round, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS,
Aug. 11, 2005, at 13 (arguing that what is needed in this context “is the opposite of the utopian 
imagination”); Greider, supra note 86, at A23 (arguing that “the American establishment is 
enthralled by utopian convictions – the market orthodoxy of free trade globalization”).  In a recent 
U.N. report, it was thought sufficiently important to assert:  “The United Nations was never intended 
to be a utopian exercise.  It was meant to be a collective security system that worked.”  U.N. PANEL 
REPORT, supra note 50, at 4, 77 (same).  In all these characterizations, utopia is an escape, something 
unable to address the hard tasks of decisions and detail, but they miss the positive element of utopia 
as possibility.  The term unfortunately no longer retains its sense, as Rothstein puts it, of an ideal.  
See Rothstein, supra. For Ricoeur the most critical element of utopia is not its realizability but its 
ability to preserve a distance between itself as the possible or ideal and reality.  See RICOEUR,
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symbolically mediated. . . . [S]ymbolic systems belong already to the infrastructure, to the basic 
constitution of human being.”180 Human action is immediately and always infused with cultural 
patterns and meanings.181 Without a symbolic structure to social life, we would be unable to project 
our activities into ideas or understand how our activities can create illusions.182 It is only because 
human social life is symbolically structured that it can become distorted.183 “[A] symbolic structure 
of action . . . is absolutely primitive and ineluctable.”184 
Lakoff agrees that this ineluctable symbolic structuring of human activity derives from the 
very nature of human cognition.  Our categorization process does not originate in formal, logical 
divisions but in imaginative structures such as metaphor.  Lakoff and his frequent collaborator Mark 
Johnson describe conceptual metaphor as “what makes most abstract thought possible . . . . [I]t is the 
very means by which we are able to make sense of our experience.”185 Radial categories, for 
 
LECTURES, supra note 37, at 180. 
180 Id. at 258.  For a prior quotation of this passage, see supra text accompanying note 98. 
181 See id. at 12. 
182 See id. at 8. 
183 Id. at 10. 
184 Id. at 77. 
185 GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND 
AND ITS CHALLENGES TO WESTERN THOUGHT 129 (1999) [hereinafter LAKOFF & JOHNSON,
PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH].  For an earlier well-known  collaboration, see GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK 
JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980).  I analyze in greater detail elsewhere the theses here of 
Lakoff and Johnson.  See George H. Taylor, Cognitive Theory, Conscience, and Law, 6 GRAVEN 
IMAGES: STUDIES IN CULTURE, LAW, AND THE SACRED (forthcoming 2006) [hereinafter Taylor, 
Cognitive Theory]. 
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example, are not deductive derivations of a prior general principle but divergent extensions.186 
Lakoff and Johnson’s approach to categorization derives from cognitive theory, the science of the 
brain and mind.  Conceptual categorization is tied to the framing process that occurs in the synaptic 
operation of the brain.187 A fact is understood not as an independent idea but only as our conceptual 
framing is able to address and incorporate the idea.188 What is foundational is not the fact but the 
framing.189 
It is essential to comprehend the consequences of  the symbolic structure of action for the 
portrayal of ideology.  We humans do not find ourselves confronted first with the facts of social life 
and then construct ideas – an ideology – about them.  Rather social life “incorporates an ideological 
layer”; the ideological layer is a component of social life itself.190 The relationship between ideology 
and social life is not fundamentally one of opposition – ideology as a distortion of social life – but of 
 
186 LAKOFF & JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH, supra note 185, at 177-78. 
187 See, e.g., id. at 57 (“[P]rimary metaphor . . . is a matter of immediate conceptual mapping 
via neural connections.”).  Ricoeur has himself engaged in discussion about the contributions of 
cognitive theory, although that discussion did not directly address the categorization model of human 
cognition.  See JEAN-PIERRE CHANGEUX & PAUL RICOEUR, WHAT MAKES US THINK? A
NEUROSCIENTIST AND A PHILOSOPHER ARGUE ABOUT ETHICS, HUMAN NATURE, AND THE BRAIN 
(2000). 
188 See, e.g., LAKOFF, DON’T THINK, supra note 74, at 17. 
189 See id. at xv (“Frames are mental structures that shape the way we see the world. . . . In 
politics our frames shape our social policies and the institutions we form to carry our policies.”). 
190 RICOEUR, LECTURES, supra note 37, at 223. 
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an “inner connection.”191 Ideology is not epiphenomenal or derivative but rather has materiality; it is 
a nonremovable aspect of human action.192 
The inextricability within social life of ideology and the symbolic structure of action is 
further explained and defined when we contemplate an ideology’s ability to motivate.193 On the one 
hand, motivation entails something more than an understanding of fact; it requires an understanding 
of the fact within a symbolic structure, that is, a conceptual framework,194 an interpretive 
understanding.195 Second, motivation involves not just acceptance or not of fact but persuasion.196 
This dynamic is perhaps best exemplified in the discussion of power.  As we have seen, political 
power operates not simply by means of force.197 It also seeks to establish its legitimacy.  It asserts a 
claim of legitimacy and seeks to motivate the populace to believe in its legitimacy.198 Motivation is 
intrinsic to the claim to and belief in an authority’s legitimacy; an authority’s power rests not only on 
 
191 Id. at 10. 
192 Part of Ricoeur’s argument in the Lectures is a rejection of the traditional Marxist view 
that distinguishes economics as basic (infrastructural) and ideas as derivative (superstructural).  See, 
e.g., id. at 152-53.  Elsewhere I defend more directly the materiality of cognition.  See Taylor, 
Derrick Bell’s Narratives, supra note 106. 
193 Ricoeur’s discussion of motivation draws upon the work of Weber.  See, e.g., RICOEUR,
LECTURES, supra note 37, at 186-87. 
194 See id. at 120-21. 
195 See id. at 186. 
196 See id. at 134. 
197 See supra text accompanying notes 49-51. 
198 See id. at 154 (“For Weber the problem of domination [i.e., political authority] implied a 
system of motives wherein the claims to legitimacy of an authority attempt to meet the capacity of 
belief in this legitimacy.”). 
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its force or its marshaling of facts but on its ability to persuade, to create an ideology in which people 
believe.199 
Political judgment may proceed, but as Lakoff maintains, “the truth alone will not set you 
free.”200 Provision of facts is insufficient; the truths must be framed effectively.201 We cannot 
extricate ourselves from ideology and the symbolic structuring of social life.  We must understand 
the ineradicable role of rhetoric, affect, motivation, and persuasion in social life as well.202 Liberal 
reliance on a claim to reason will not go far enough.  The point is not simply that social life operates 
in a manner that situates reason within a larger ideological framework.  Liberals need to realize that 
their own discourse derives, as Lakoff elucidates, 
from an Enlightenment tradition of supposedly literal, rational, issue-oriented 
discourse, a tradition of debate using “neutral” conceptual resources. . . . If liberals 
are to create an adequate moral discourse to counter conservatives, they must get over 
their view that all thought is literal and that straightforward rational literal debate on 
an issue is always possible.  That idea is false – empirically false – and if liberals 
stick to it they will have little hope of constructing a discourse that is a strong moral 
response to conservative discourse.203 
199 We add to the affective dimension of ideology when we recognize that an ideology’s 
ability to motivate may also act on us subconsciously.  See id. at 229. 
200 LAKOFF, DON’T THINK, supra note 74, at 33.  See also id. at 115 (“The facts unframed will 
not set you free. . . . Frames trump facts. . . . Always reframe.”). 
201 See id. at 33. 
202 This contention joins other recent analysis linking affect and reason.  See, e.g., ANTONIO 
DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAIN (1994); MARTHA C. 
NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS (2001). 
203 LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS, supra note 121, at 387.  That rational literal debate is 
empirically false owes to Lakoff’s (and others’) work in cognitive theory on metaphors and framing 
and on other scholarship such as in decision theory.  See, e.g., id. at 373 (citing work by Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky); LAKOFF, DON’T THINK, supra note 74, at 18 (same).  An analogy 
could be drawn to work in behavioral law and economics that shows that people often decide not on 
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Liberals also need to discern that their own stance is not simply one of reason but is ideological 
itself.204 Finally, because “truth” does not equate with political victory, liberals need to acknowledge 
the role of organization both in generating ideas and frames and in motivating voters to vote for 
them.205 On election day 2004, for example, I was continuously impressed by the value of 
organizing in motivating voters (and Democratic challengers) to go to the polls. 
Lakoff and Ricoeur share much in their criticism of the insufficiency of political models 
based on appeals to right reason or economic self-interest.  Lakoff argues that liberals can counter 
 
the basis of reason but on the basis of loss aversion, self-serving bias, heuristic biases, and so on.  
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1997).  But this 
analysis differs from the approach to ideology advanced in this Article, because while it wants to 
address the actuality of these decisional processes, it appears to view this non-rationalistic reasoning 
as simply distortive.  See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1059, 1065 (2000) (“Why, exactly, might people’s judgments about risk and risk regulation go 
badly wrong?”).  In recent work, Owen Jones has related evolutionary biology to behavioral law and 
economics to suggest that behaviors that may be maladaptive now may have been adaptive in our 
evolutionary human past.  See Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law’s 
Leverage:  Behavioral Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1141, 1172 (2001). 
 It is notable that Jones insists that the current behavior is “substantively irrational or maladaptive.”  
Id. (I thank David Herring for mentioning Jones’s article.)  For those liberals who might reject the 
ineluctability of ideology, it might perhaps be possible nevertheless to accept that many in current 
political practice do operate ideologically and then proceed instrumentally, as behavioral law and 
economists do, to assess political strategy in light of this reality rather than insist that people behave 
“rationally.” 
204 See supra text accompanying note 159. 
205 Frank criticizes: “While leftists sit around congratulating themselves on their personal 
virtue, the right understands the central significance of movement-building, and they have taken to 
the task with admirable diligence.”  FRANK, WHAT’S THE MATTER, supra note 31, at 247.  He 
recounts in some detail examples of the conservative organizing that has occurred in Kansas.  See, 
e.g., id. at 93-94, 175.  He also notes the institutional work of conservatives nationwide to develop 
and broadcast their message: for example, the creation of counterinstitutions, alternative professional 
organizations, think tanks, and magazines.  See id. at 195.  Lakoff cites reports stating that those on 
the right spent over a billion dollars in the 1990s to support conservative think tanks and that they 
outfund liberal think tanks and other organizations by a ratio of four-to-one.  See LAKOFF, MORAL 
POLITICS, supra note 121, at 416. 
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conservatives by reframing political discourse away from conservative models.  Ricoeur’s 
vocabulary concentrates on the terms of ideology and the symbolic structuring of action.  Both 
Lakoff and Ricoeur agree that the frames or ideologies of opponents should not be simply 
demonized; these ideologies hold for their adherents much of positive integrative value.  Ideological 
distortions may be addressed; this is not an attempt to launch reason against ideology but to attempt 
either to show an ideology’s inner contradictions – its noncoherence – or the greater persuasiveness 
of an alternative ideology.  Arguments of apparent fact against an ideology may often fail, because an 
ideology weaves a larger frame, built on larger  notions of rationale and on elements of belief and 
faith.  
Ricoeur’s theory of ideology goes beyond Lakoff’s approach, I believe, in at least two ways.  
First, he introduces as Lakoff does not an analysis of the legitimacy of authority and of the 
relationship between an authority’s claim to authority and the citizenry’s belief in that authority.  
While both Ricoeur and Lakoff attend the nature of human cognition, Ricoeur’s analysis here adds a 
more specific political dimension to the discussion of ideology.  Lakoff’s theory of framing remains 
more tied to cognitive theory.206 Ricoeur’s analysis of the gap between claim and belief also 
provides greater insight than does Lakoff into how an ideology can fail:  the gap can become too big, 
and claim and belief may become disjoined. 
Second, Ricoeur locates the remaining availability of political dispute and judgment not in a 
contention of frame versus frame, as Lakoff does, but in the dispute between ideology and utopia.  
Ideology is in this sense something that preserves the current identity of an individual or group, while 
 
206 As I have argued elsewhere, Lakoff’s theory does generally offer greater precision than 
Ricoeur in the understanding of how the metaphoric capacities of the mind function.  See Taylor, 
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utopia “claims to assume a better future for humanity,”207 it claims new possibilities.208 “[W]e must 
try to cure the illnesses of utopia by what is wholesome in ideology – by its element of identity, 
which is once more a fundamental function of life – and try to cure the rigidity, the petrification, of 
ideologies by the utopian element.”209 Conservative and liberal stances may have within each both 
ideological and utopian characteristics.  The positive ideological aspect of one – its integrative 
function – will criticize what it views to be the negative utopian aspect of the other – its flight into 
fancy.210 As merely illustrative examples, the positive conservative ideology of equal opportunity 
will criticize the liberal utopian “fancy” of equality of outcome, while the positive liberal ideology of 
the regulated state will criticize the conservative utopian “fancy” of the free market.  Conversely, the 
positive utopian aspect of one – its sense of real possibility – will criticize the negative ideological 
aspect of the other – its hidebound maintenance of outmoded norms.  Again to be simply suggestive, 
 
Cognitive Theory, supra note 185.  For an important exception to this generality, see infra note 208. 
207 RICOEUR, LECTURES, supra note 37, at 173. 
208 An ideological structure may then have, in the narrower senses just used, both ideological 
and utopian components.  Henceforth, when referring to an ideology as inclusive of both narrower 
elements, I shall use the term of an ideological framework. 
209 Id. at 312. 
210 Less broadly, we find in campaign rhetoric battles between tradition (ideology) and 
possibility (utopia).  Some voters may find the promises of possibility offered by one candidate more 
alluring than the tradition (existing reality) offered by another, while other voters may find more 
reliable the tradition offered by one candidate versus the possibilities whose realities are uncertain 
offered by another.  In the 2004 presidential election, for example, at a time when the country was 
engaged in a war with Iraq, a number of voters voted in favor of the known quantity of the 
incumbent, President Bush, versus the uncertain possibilities offered by his challenger, John Kerry.  
See, e.g., Kate Zernike & John M. Broder, The 2004 Elections:  The Electorate – The Mood of the 
Electorate; War?  Job?  No, Character Counted Most to Voters, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2004, at P1 
(asserting that character was the primary criterion used by most presidential voters but that the war 
also played a role in many’s decision to vote in favor of President Bush). 
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the prospective conservative utopian virtues of a global free market will criticize the liberal 
adherence to a heavily regulated domestic labor market (e.g., unionized labor law), while the 
prospective liberal utopian virtues of a more inclusive definition of the family will criticize the 
conservative adherence to a definition of the family as headed by two heterosexual parents.  As 
apparent – and as I have argued throughout – what one ideology may view as integrative (e.g., the 
deference to be granted the market), the other ideology may view as distortive. 
The dialectic of ideology and utopia is not simply a clash of ideological frame versus 
ideological frame (and certainly not one merely of fact versus fact).  Ideology and utopia are offset; 
they bring out different valences in an ideological framework.  They also each can persuade.  How?  
I have already adverted to the roles played by motivation, affect, and belief.211 But here I want to 
concentrate more finely on how a conceptual framework such as an ideology can be transformed.  A 
clue, I think, lies in Ricoeur’s frequent intonation that a utopia can “shatter” a given order.212 I am 
struck that Ricoeur also describes metaphors as shattering a given order.213 In his work on metaphor, 
Ricoeur attends the “rifts” metaphor creates in a given order, the way it “disturbs and displaces” 
order.214 Metaphor shatters the given order in order to present a new order.215 Metaphor “break[s] 
 
211 See supra text accompanying notes 193-99, 202. 
212 Ricoeur originally draws the term “shatter” from Karl Mannheim, whom Ricoeur quotes 
as defining utopia as that which tends A>to shatter, either partially or wholly, the order of things 
prevailing at the time.’” RICOEUR, LECTURES, supra note 37, at 173, quoting KARL MANNHEIM,
IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA 192 (Louis Wirth & Edward Shils trans., 1936) [Harvest Books ed.].  But in 
Ricoeur’s frequent repetition of the term to describe utopia, see, e.g., RICOEUR, LECTURES, supra 
note 37, at 175, 179, 273, 285, 289, 309, Ricoeur makes the word his own. 
213 Paul Ricoeur, Creativity in Language, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PAUL RICOEUR 120, 132 
(1978) [hereinafter Ricoeur, Creativity]. 
214 PAUL RICOEUR, THE RULE OF METAPHOR: MULTI-DISCIPLINARY STUDIES OF THE 
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through previous categorization and . . . establish[es] new logical boundaries on the ruins of the 
preceding ones.”216 Utopias can create metaphoric transformations in an ideological framework.  For 
example, consider the Administration’s failures to respond timely and adequately to the damages of 
Hurricane Katrina and its efforts to locate responsibility elsewhere.217 A reinvigorated liberal ideal 
could speak to the positive role of assistance that government may and should provide, and this 
might help shatter the prevailing ideology that rejects that government plays any positive domestic 
function.  Ideologies in turn can resist utopias on the claim that the metaphoric transformation does 
not work:  the utopian possibilities are not real or functional or create too much dislocation or are 
simply fanciful.  Will social conservatives come to view as fanciful the President’s assertion that he 
is one of them in light of his nomination to the Supreme Court of Harriet Miers?218 Ideologies can 
change or not metaphorically on the same basis as their order is constituted, that is, metaphorically or 
symbolically.219 This is but to reiterate the nature of an ideology’s composition and that this 
 
CREATION OF MEANING IN LANGUAGE 22 (Robert Czerny trans., 1977) [hereinafter RICOEUR, THE 
RULE OF METAPHOR]. 
215 Id. 
216 Ricoeur, Creativity, supra note 213, at 131.  Ricoeur’s attention to metaphor as shattering 
and transformative constitutes another signal difference between his work and Lakoff’s.  Lakoff and 
Johnson insist that novel metaphors do not transform but rather follow the same mapping as prior 
primary metaphors.  See, e.g., LAKOFF AND JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH, supra note 185, at 
66-67.  Because of this emphasis, they do not seem able to explain how ideological change can occur 
other than as a contest between frame and frame.  Elsewhere I pursue further some of the 
implications of this difference between Ricoeur and Lakoff and Johnson in their theories of 
metaphor.  See Taylor, Cognitive Theory, supra note 185. 
217 See supra text accompanying note 82. 
218 See supra text accompanying note 84. 
219 RICOEUR, THE RULE OF METAPHOR, supra note 214, at 22 (“[C]ould we not imagine that 
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composition may be challenged and transformed not so much by fact as by an alternate metaphoric 
ideological framework. 
 
Conclusion 
On election day 2004, I witnessed at firsthand the passion to vote demonstrated by the voters 
of Cleveland’s Ward 14.  To be able to marshal that passion in the future, not only in urban 
Cleveland but in greater areas nationwide,  Democrats need to understand as Republicans already do 
the degree to which voters decide to cast their ballot not out of simple economic self-interest or on 
the basis of mere fact.  Along with continued voter mobilization, the revival of a theory of ideology – 
not just as distortion but as legitimacy and as identification – will help the political parties to 
impassion more voters both to vote and to vote on behalf of their goals.  Understanding a theory of 
ideology will also assist the subtlety by which election law analysis investigates and assesses voter 
motivation. 
 
the [metaphoric] process that disturbs and displaces a certain logical order, a certain conceptual 
hierarchy, a certain classification scheme, is the same as that from which all classification 
proceeds?”). 
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